USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

REBUILDING IRAQ – THE DANISH INTERAGENCY STRATEGY

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Report Documentation Page		*Form Approved* *OMB No. 0704-0188*

1. REPORT DATE **30 MAR 2007**	2. REPORT TYPE **Strategy Research Project**	3. DATES COVERED **00-00-2006 to 00-00-2007**
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **Rebuilding Iraq - the Danish Interagency Strategy**		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) **Henrik Lyhne**		5d. PROJECT NUMBER
		5e. TASK NUMBER
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks,Carlisle,PA,17013-5050**		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
See attached.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**		**25**	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Henrik Lyhne

TITLE: Rebuilding Iraq – the Danish Interagency Strategy

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 9 February 2007 WORD COUNT: 6873 PAGES: 25

KEY TERMS: Post-Conflict, Stability, Reconstruction, Inter-Agency Approach

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

   Approximately three years ago Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq by means of a one party system where political opponents were removed ruthlessly or forced into exile. International conventions and laws were not respected, Iraqi laws were not respected, and the regime used all available means of power to secure its own survival at the expense of the Iraqi population. Iraq had become an international pariah that was targeted by sanctions enforced by the international community. Today Iraq is at a strategic crossroad. Though much has been accomplished in the three years since the fall of Saddam Hussein, there are still significant challenges ahead, and the achieved progress is fragile. At this point it is important not to leave the burden of improving security, consolidating democracy, and of continuing reconstruction efforts with Iraq's relatively weak civilian and military institutions.

   This project will examine the three parallel and mutually impressionable main tendencies in Iraq today: progress in the political process, endeavors to rebuild the country, and a continued serious security situation. The project will then analyze the current Danish interagency strategy for the reconstruction of Iraq in order to evaluate whether the Danish efforts are well spent and likely to achieve the identified objectives.

REBUILDING IRAQ – THE DANISH INTERAGENCY STRATEGY

Today Iraq is at a strategic crossroad. Though much has been accomplished in the three years since the fall of Saddam Hussein, there are still significant challenges, ahead and the achieved progress is fragile.[1] At this point it is important not to leave the burden of improving security, consolidating democracy, and of continuing reconstruction efforts with Iraq's relatively weak civilian and military institutions.

Three parallel tendencies that constantly impact on each other are predominant in Iraq today: (1) progress in the political process, (2) endeavors to rebuild the country, and (3) a continued serious security situation including violent incidents especially in the central part of Iraq but also in other areas characterized by religiously and ethically mixed populations.[2] It is first and foremost the Iraqis who suffer from the terrorist attacks.[3] However the latter is only one part of the explanation for the continued violence. The wish to control the political process as expressed by Shia and Kurdish leaders and the initial Sunni refusal to participate have also played a vital role in the renewal of the sectarian violence and the religious persecution which has been registered following the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra on February 22, 2006.[4]

As Iraq makes its way toward open and capable governance, the international community is currently engaged in a helping effort. One nation, Denmark, is doing its part to assist the Iraqi people through a variety of programs, which will be described and evaluated as part of this paper.

The Political Situation

By the end of April 2006, following the ratification of the Constitution of Iraq on October 15, 2005 and the general elections on December 15, 2005, the establishment of the Iraqi coalition government was initiated after lengthy and difficult negotiations.[5] After six months of negotiations a coalition government was agreed upon between the United Iraqi Alliance, Iraqi Accord front, Kurdistani Alliance, and Iraqi National List. The 275-member Iraqi Council of Representatives reelected Kurd Jalal Talabani as the president and elected Shia Jawad Malaki as the new prime minister. Mahmoud Mashhadani, representing the Sunni population, was elected as the new chairman of the parliament.[6] The objective, agreed upon by the international community and the Iraqi key players, was to establish a broad coalition government encompassing all predominant Iraqi political, ethnical, and religious groups that could be the future catalyst in the attempt to reduce sectarian violence.[7] It was important to include and involve groups that had suffered a significant loss of power following the downfall of Saddam

Hussein. At the same time it was apparent that the Al-Qaida initiated terrorist attacks could not be stopped by political means only, but had to be handled by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), assisted by the Multinational Security Forces (MSF).[8] A broad coalition government with a true power sharing arrangement was a necessity, but not sufficient in itself to improve the security situation. Prior to the renewed momentum in the political situation the Iraqi leaders had established the National Security Political Council (NSPC), consisting of leading representatives from all predominant Iraqi political groupings and leading representatives from the legislative, executive, and judiciary systems. The primary task of the NSPC would be to advise the government and the parliament in questions concerning security and other related issues of similar importance.

In Security Resolution (SR) 1546, the United Nations (UN) was mandated to support the political process in Iraq. Apart from having created the master plan and supporting deadlines, the UN was and still is the primary adviser to Iraq, supporting the Iraqi authorities' endeavors to create democracy. UN assistance also included support to the three pivotal elections in 2005.[9]

Embedded in the overall UN master plan, the Danish assistance to Iraq focused on concrete supportive measures to boost Iraq's struggle for democracy from the very start, including assistance to the three key 2005 elections. This support included economic contributions to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), governed by the UN and the World Bank.[10] Additionally, Denmark employed election observers across Iraq, and invited key Iraqi political figures to visit Denmark to offer them a first hand impression of Danish democratic institutions, ranging from the local to the governmental level.

Perspectives for Consolidating Iraq's New Democracy

With the completion of the political transition process as described in SR 1546 the foundation stones for a continued development and consolidation of the Iraqi democracy will be in place.[11] However the future process will inevitably be characterized by the vast number of long term challenges, of which the eight most important are: (1) the establishment of a new constitutional committee responsible for creating recommendations for constitutional amendments, (2) the establishment of a second chamber in the parliament, (3) provincial council elections, (4) the improvement of the security situation including enhanced ISF capabilities, allowing the MNF to step down their involvement and visibility, (5) increased momentum in the reconstruction process with international aid organizations such as the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) playing increasingly visible parts, (6) the improvement of the Iraqi public administrative system with a special focus on the

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educational and the health care systems, (7) policy reforms, including the liquidation of the policy on subsidization in order to stimulate investments in the public sector, and (8) the integration of Iraq into the international community following the period spent as a pariah under Saddam Hussein's rule.[12]

<u>The Economic Situation</u>

Three conflicts, 13 years of sanctions following the first Gulf war in 1991, and almost three decades of dictatorship have damaged Iraq's economy severely and reduced the living standard of the Iraqi population significantly.[13] On the UN's Human Development Index (HDI), Iraq dropped from position number 76 in 1990, to position 126 in 2000. No other country underwent a similar descent in the same period. In the 1980's Iraq had an income per capita equaling the standard of South Korea, which today is considered one of the Asian Tiger economies.[14] The Iraqi educational system in that time period was among the best in the Arab world and the country had a regionally assessed well functioning health care sector.[15] Per capita income, once over US$3,600, declined below $1,000 by 2001 - 2002; today per capita income is estimated at about $1,635, less than half of what Iraqis enjoyed 25 years ago.[16] The Saddam Hussein regime was the main reason for Iraq's current economic problems. Available resources were to a large extent spent on an unproductive military sector and on the well-being of the ruling class. Inadequate investments in key infrastructural sectors, combined with the consequences of international and regional isolation, led to deterioration of infrastructure and a substantial lack of economic development.

Potentially Iraq is a wealthy country with the world's third largest known oil reserve equaling 112 billion barrels of oil.[17] The exploitation of the potential will require significant investments in the oil sector, however, coupled with an improvement in the security situation. Apart from sabotage targeting and endangering the production potential directly the prevailing security situation keeps vital investments and the necessary influx of technical expertise from entering the country. In spite of the existence of a corps of well educated and experienced public servants, Iraq's administrative capacity has suffered under the burden of nepotism and high-handedness for many years. The result is an administrative culture that does not meet the requirements and standards for acceptable governance which are required in order to achieve the necessary modernization of Iraq.[18] Additionally the judiciary system has been subjected to Saddam Hussein's manipulation and misgovernment including corruption and the acceptance of bribery over the past three decades. This culture still exists. Iraq's administrative sector is

furthermore influenced by the de-Ba'athification process that led to the dismissal of a large number of public servants.

The reconstruction of Iraq and the transition of the country from command economy and one-party rule to an open market economy under democratic rule is a complex and comprehensive mission that will take time and require a considerable contribution and commitment from the international community.

In 2003 the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF developed an analysis for Iraq. The analysis estimated that the need for investments in medium-term reconstruction activities was US$36 billion for the period 2004 – 2007.[19] On top of this they added $20 billion earmarked specifically for investments in security and the oil industry. Thus the total investment plan was estimated to amount to approximately $56 billion.

Today, three years after the implementation of this investment plan, it is uncertain whether the plan actually will cover all the costs since the state of the infrastructure is worse than initially anticipated, and the security situation not as favorable as expected to the reconstruction efforts.[20]

It was never the intention that the full costs of the reconstruction should be paid by the international community. A large proportion of the reconstruction was meant to be paid by the Iraqis themselves, counting on the revenues from the increasingly profitable oil production. This concept makes it possible to view the aid of the international society as a transitional effort with the purpose of reinforcing the Iraqi investments in areas where the Iraqi assets are lacking or insufficient to achieve the identified objective. In 2004 the income per capita increased to $942 and reached $1,635 in 2006.[21] The economic conditions have been improved through liberalization of prices, without including the energy and food sectors that remain strongly subsidized. The old currency has been replaced by a new one that has proven to be stable, and the population has access to buy fundamental necessities, such as food.[22]

Reconstruction of Iraq – the Danish Contribution

The Danish reconstruction support is part of the international assistance that has been offered to Iraq since the downfall of Saddam Hussein.[23] Furthermore, the Danish support is continuously coordinated with other contributing countries and organizations such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU), the World Bank, and the UN. The Danish contribution is concentrated along with the Danish troops in the Basra province in the Southern part of Iraq. The support plan has 6 main areas that are pivotal to reconstruction efforts: (1) democratization, human rights, and judicial reforms, (2) economic development

(agriculture and infrastructure), (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) multinational reconstruction assistance, and (5) military and/or civilian advisory assistance.[24]

Since 2003 the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had a civilian led control unit responsible for Danish civilian support in place in Basra City. The control unit is responsible for the contact with the Iraqi authorities in the Basra Province. At the same time civil-military cooperation between the civilian control unit and the Danish military command in the Basra Province and between the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish Department of Defense has been established.[25] The Danish Justice Department and its directly subordinated police authorities are heavily engaged in the training of the Iraqi police forces.

Human rights promotion is an essential part of the Danish support to the Iraqi authorities.[26] Thus the legal adviser in the control unit works with the local and regional judges, district attorneys, police, lawyers, and the three law faculties in the Basra Province in the attempt to create a more open and transparent judicial system. In addition, the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) is an important player in the local cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).[27] In close cooperation with the local organizations the DIHR has established a local NGO house in Basra. This house supports a wide variety of human rights organizations and other organizations in the Southern part of Iraq. More than 250 NGOs are currently attached to the house that is 100% operated by local Iraqi employees and Iraqi expertise.

The agricultural adviser in the control unit is responsible for assistance to the Iraqi Department of Agriculture in Baghdad and local authorities in the four Southern provinces of Iraq. Danish assistance has contributed to the implementation of a credit program that is now in use not just around Basra but in 14 out 18 Iraqi provinces.[28] The program is 100% funded by Iraqi resources and is being executed entirely by Iraqi institutions. In 2005, approximately 7,000 credits had been issued to Iraqi families, and the program is seen as an example on how to support the nationwide transition from command economy to market economy.

As a result of the tight cooperation between the Iraqi harbor authorities, a shipyard in Kuwait, and a Danish shipping company, Denmark funds a reconstruction project that will improve the Iraqi trade with the outside world through the Persian Gulf that traditionally has served as a life nerve for Iraq in general and for Southern Iraq in particular.[29] Additionally a Danish company has assisted the Iraqi authorities with a major analysis of the corridors of transport in Southern Iraq, which will be of importance to the Iraqi authorities, serving as a basis for them to determine long term priorities for the Iraqi transport and trade sectors.

Danish humanitarian contributions aim at supporting the weakest groups in the Iraqi society. People who have been forced to leave their homes for ethnical reasons or as a result of violence constitute a particularly vulnerable group. Through Danish NGOs and the UN the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has spent approximately $25 million in humanitarian support in order to help the above-mentioned groups of people.[30] This support includes mine clearing operations, school rehabilitation, food and health programs, and infrastructural rehabilitation.

The coordination of the civilian and the military efforts in the Southern part of Iraq is the cornerstone of Danish support.[31] This coordination consists of two parts: (1) the military support to the civilian Danish reconstruction efforts in the form of security and logistical support, both of the highest importance to the successful outcome of the Danish aid program, and (2) the projects that are planned and executed through the Danish military forces in the province. This kind of support has proven especially valuable in the form of a sequence of minor but highly visible projects that help the local Iraqi population in their daily struggles to improve life. The projects that are initiated and executed through the military forces have increased steadily in numbers owing to the fact that the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs attached a civilian adviser directly to the Danish Battle Group in the Basra Province in 2005.[32] In recognition of the importance of these small scale projects with disproportionably large importance for the Iraqi population in Southern Iraq the concept was additionally reinforced with additional manning resources in 2006.

The American and British initiative to establish Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) aims at supporting an effective Iraqi administration, and thus it is a central element in the overall strategy for the reconstruction of the Iraqi capabilities. Denmark actively supports this initiative.[33] The PRTs form a necessary link between the reconstruction of the capabilities at the national and the regional levels. It is the responsibility of the PRTs to initiate necessary activities in order to reinforce the local administration. Civilian experts will constitute the core of the PRTs and they will perform their tasks in close cooperation with the relevant Iraqi authorities. The attached military components will support the PRTs providing security and logistical back-up. Currently the PRTs are either American, Coalition, or Iraqi led. The PRT is seen as the asset to fill the vacuum that is often left out in the transition phase when focus is shifted from a military to a civilian focused effort. In the Basra Province Danish assets are planned to be included in a British led PRT.

<u>The Security Situation</u>

The security situation in Iraq continues to be serious. The worst violence seems to be concentrated in five of Iraq's 18 provinces. The Salah al-Din and the Anbar provinces in Central Iraq constitute the core areas for the Sunni uprising and the violence is targeting the coalition forces and Iraqi institutions. Especially in the Baghdad area but generally in areas with mixed population groups, the Sunni-Shia sectarian violence dominates.[34]

During the days of the Saddam Hussein regime the security forces and the dreaded Mukhabarat intelligence services kept a lid on the ethnic, religious, and tribe related tensions by applying the means of sheer brutality.[35] Toward the end of Saddam Hussein's regime a cynical divide and rule mentality in favor of certain population groups was also used as a tool to ensure the survival of the regime.

In an environment where the new democratic Iraq is coming to life the attempt by means of terror has been made to encourage the differences between Iraq's many different groupings. The means have included the terror attacks executed with the primary purpose of undermining the democratization process and provoking sectarian violence. The Iraqi population suffers the worst part of the pain, and it is the same group that suffers the consequences of delayed reconstruction activities including unstable power and water supplies and inadequate economic process due to reduced oil revenues. The terror attacks are only one part of the explanation for the increasing violence between Iraqi groupings. The desire of the Kurdish and Shia leaders to control the political process and gain domination over geographical areas, coupled with the Sunni political disunion and initial refusal to participate in the political process, has played a similarly important part.

The first serious sectarian-religious terror attack was the killing of the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim in Najaf August 29, 2003, shortly after his return to Iraq after many years in exile.[36] Subsequently the area has witnessed killings of both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Another serious incident took place February 22, 2006 when one of the most holy Shia mosques, the Imam al-Hadi Mosque (The Golden Mosque) in Samarra was bombed. This led to retaliation attacks by Shia elements that targeted more than 160 Sunni mosques and killed several hundred Sunni Muslims. Even though the majority of the Iraqis have disassociated themselves from the attacks the perpetrators have succeeded in igniting sectarian violence in Iraq.

The armed elements in Iraq encompass a broad group with different motivations and methods. The armed Sunni uprising enjoys to some extent the support of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs. The uprising is controlled by members of the old regime from the Baath party, the four

Mukhabarat intelligence services, and the former army and police forces that have lost their power and privileges since the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Additionally, it is caused by the fear of Shia dominance. A necessary part of the solution must be found in the political process where the involvement of the Sunnis through real power sharing and genuine influence can lead to reduced violence. Furthermore foreign Islamic terrorists including the Jordanian terrorist al-Zarqawis's organization with ties to the al-Qaida organization are contributing to the violence.[37]The Kurdish parties have organized "persmerga militia groups" that primarily operate in the Kurdish province. The Shia Muslim Badr militia which is the armed part of SCIRI is the largest and best organized para-military organization, which traditionally was part of the armed fight against Saddam Hussein operating out of bases in Iran.[38] The Mahdi militia controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr previously demonstrated acceptance of direct confrontation with the coalition forces, especially in the periods of April and August in 2004.[39] However Al-Sadr has engaged himself in the political process and today this is his primary trait. Apart from the nationwide militias, the Southern part of Iraq in particular is home to a number of minor armed militias affiliated with different political groupings.

Opposed to these groupings the ISF has assumed increasing responsibility for the fight against the armed violence. The work of the political and religious leaders has so far blocked a general mobilization of Iraq into armed sectarian groups, but they have been unsuccessful in stopping the violence in areas with mixed population groups. Thus the sectarian violence has not spread to the entire country but is prevalent in areas where ethnic-religious groups have special unsolved issues.

As part of the reorganization of the ISF members of the militias have been offered the opportunity to join the Iraq's officially recognized security apparatus.[40] This process has not been without problems, however, since the Shia militia members to a certain extent have infiltrated the ISF. Especially in the areas with mixed population groups, members of the police forces have used their positions not only to target the violent armed uprising but also to launch retaliatory actions targeting especially Sunni Muslims following the attack on the Golden Mosque.

To limit the damaging effects of the militias they should be either disarmed or integrated into the ISF, where they can be given proper training. While the latter currently is being pursued as one way of solving parts of the violence it is being recognized that a long term solution is dependent on the political process. Positive political results combined with the above-mentioned controlled training of former militia members are likely to reduce the power and influence of the militias significantly.

Violent traditional crime, especially including offenses against property, constitutes a serious problem for the civilian Iraqis and the international experts in Iraq. Since the ISF is engaged mainly in the fight against the Sunni uprising, the terrorists, and sectarian violence, the additional resources required to fight traditional crime are very limited. It is assessed that a significant number of the civilian fatalities and casualties since the end of the war in 2003 can be traced back to the results of traditional crime.[41]

The overall objective for the Iraqis and the international community is to enable Iraq to assume full responsibility for maintaining security and stability in Iraq. The Iraqis have a vital interest in stopping the violence and the Iraqi government therefore has a stated ambition to become capable of maintaining security and stability. Therefore the aim is to: (1) train and equip the ISF, (2) gradually hand over the responsibility for specific operations to the ISF, (3) enhance the capabilities of the Iraqi Department of defense and the Iraqi Department of Interior Affairs, and (4) set the conditions and the process for the handover to the Iraqis of the formal and full responsibility for maintaining security.[42]

The aim is to train and equip the ISF.[43] But increasingly the focus is also directed toward the establishment of institutional capacities to support both the police forces and the armed forces. The aim is to establish professional police and armed forces representing all the ethnic and the religious groupings of the country.

When the ISF has been established, the multinational forces are still required to continue the training of the ISF and to perform certain security missions.[44] Thus, for the ISF to be able to operate without the support of the multinational forces they need continued training, and there is a continued need for logistical support, development of departmental capacities and intelligence services. Establishment of command and control and combat service support structures is a time consuming project. The next step will be a situation where the ISF is capable of operating independently of the multinational forces and the formal transfer of responsibility for security to the Iraqi authorities can take place.

As a consequence of the efforts of the multinational security forces, combined with the desire of the Iraqis to maintain security in Iraq, the ISF now has responsibility for security in approximately 65% of Iraq.[45] Although operations controlled by the Iraqi army following the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra has limited the violence, this sign of Iraqi effectiveness still needs to be spread to the remaining parts of Iraq.

Since well functioning departments are the basis for the administrative operation of the police forces as well as the armed forces, the education of public servants in both the Iraqi Department of Defense and in the Iraqi Department of Interior Affairs forms an important part of

the work of the multinational security forces in Iraq. In order to reinforce this work the two training teams (Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)) responsible for this were subordinated directly to the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) on October 1, 2005.[46]

The assessment stating when the formal responsibility can be transferred to the Iraqi authorities will take place in the Joint Committee for Accelerating the Transition of Security to Iraqis, which includes the Iraqi National Security Adviser, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of the Interior, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and the Commander of the Coalition Forces.[47] The security transition committee has been tasked to determine the conditions that must be met before the responsibility for security in the provinces and the main cities can be transferred to the Iraqis. The baseline for determining the conditions is: (1) the command and control capacity of the Iraqi authorities, (2) the threat evaluation in the specific area, (3) the military capability of the ISF, and (4) the amount of support the multinational forces can offer. Thus it is the Iraqi authorities in cooperation with the multinational forces that decide when the Iraqis are ready to accept full responsibility for security and stability.

Denmark supports the training of the ISF and the establishment of the Iraqi capabilities in a number of areas: (1) within the context of the multinational security forces, (2) within the frame work of the NATO training mission, (3) the bilateral training of the Iraqi police forces, (4) within the lines of the European Union Constitutional State Project (JUSTLEX), and (5) in the form of a Danish contribution to CMATT in Baghdad and a Danish contribution attached to CPATT also in Baghdad.[48]

The Danish Battle Group in the Basra Province employs approximately 25% its operational resources to train, to advise, and to monitor the ISF.[49] Additionally, Danish civilian police assets contribute to the training of the Iraqi police forces in close cooperation with the Danish and British military police units.[50]

The NATO Training Mission – Iraq was approved by the North Atlantic Council on November 17, 2004, as a result of a request from the Iraqi Interim Government. The NATO mission has its headquarters located in the International Zone, Baghdad. The task for the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) is to contribute to the training of the ISF, involving headquarters personnel falling under both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, and to coordinate materiel acquisitions and donations based upon the wishes and requirements of the Iraqi government.[51] NATO advises and contributes with training and establishment of institutions that subsequently will be transferred to the Iraqi authorities. The advisory mission includes actual training and mentor work in support of the command structure in primarily the Iraqi

Department of Defense and the Iraqi Department of Interior Affairs. Furthermore, NATO supports the Iraqis in the development of a lasting and standardized material and training program parallel to the reception of material donations. Another NATO focus which is being pursued in coordination and cooperation with the multinational security forces, the UN, and international organizations including international Red Cross, is the implementation of leadership and military ethics, and human rights in all aspects of the training of the ISF.[52] Denmark is one of the largest contributors to the NTM-I, providing approximately 10% of all assigned personnel.[53] The Danish contribution consists of staff personnel and instructors who train both the Iraqi command structure at the defense departmental level and train the Iraqi cadets in the basic officers training course. In order to reinforce the training of the ISF Denmark also provides personnel to CMATT in Baghdad.

As a part of the legacy from the Saddam Hussein regime the Iraqi population still fears and distrusts the police forces. Since the Iraqi police forces eventually will take over full responsibility for law and order the international community has emphasized that the multinational security forces should pay special attention to the need for assistance to the Iraq concerning the establishment of police forces operating based upon up-to-date skills and a thorough knowledge and understanding of human rights. Since 2003 the Danish police project has been executed under difficult circumstances in the Basra province and partly in Baghdad as well. The Danish civilian police training project forms a high priority project in the Danish support to Iraq and includes contributions to training and monitoring of the Iraqi police forces within the Danish area of operations in Southern Iraq. By the end of 2005 the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Danish Justice Department, and the Danish Department of Defense decided in close cooperation with UK to implement a series of adjustments to the police training project following rumors of extensive use of torture and means of intimidation in the police stations in Basra.[54] These rumors were reinforced by unconfirmed reports stating that the police forces in the Basra Province had been infiltrated by local militias. Following these incidents the human rights aspect of the training was reinforced in order to counter the undesired development.

The International Military Presence in Iraq – the Danish Military Forces

The size of the international military presence in Iraq is dynamic. It mirrors the development in the country including the progress in the political process, the economic reconstruction, and the development in the capabilities ands skills of the ISF related to the maintenance of security and stability. The significant regional differences in the security situation mean that the multinational security forces' mission accomplishments, including

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training of the ISF, have developed in different tempos. Thus, the requirement for the active participation of multinational security forces in genuine security missions should be expected to decline on different scales in different regions of the country. Basically, changes in the multinational security forces' presence in Iraq are based upon certain conditions. When the ISF has reached a level that will enable it to execute security operations independently, the transfer of responsibility will take place gradually on a province-by-province basis. Initially the ISF is recruited and trained, and following the initial training the Iraqis are increasingly involved in the execution of concrete security missions along with the multinational security forces and they steadily assume more and more control and responsibility. This would include independent execution of minor tactical tasks. Then they are given responsibility for the execution of operations supported by the multinational security forces and finally the full responsibility is transferred to the Iraqis. In this process the profile of the multinational security forces decreases and in the final phase they will only serve as a reserve that can be employed in case the ISF should prove incapable of accomplishing a specific mission. The status of the individual provinces is being evaluated continuously in order to assess when the situation is favorable to a transfer of full responsibility to the Iraqis. The evaluation is handed over to the Iraqi government followed by public announcements and concludes with formal implementation. The Al Muthanna and the Maysan Provinces in Southern Iraq led the way and will expectedly be followed by the Dhi Qar and the Basra Provinces.[55]

In Southern Iraq the military transition plan has three phases: (1) tactical surveillance, (2) operational surveillance, and (3) strategic surveillance.[56] Since December 2005 the multinational security forces have conducted tactical surveillance in the Al Muthanna and the Maysan Provinces. This means that the multinational security forces primarily conduct support and reserve missions and continued training of the ISF. This transition has not yet led to a significant reduction in the multinational security force profile, but it is expected that the transition from tactical to operational surveillance can be executed in the two above-mentioned provinces in 2006, followed later by the Dhi Qar and the Basra Provinces. When the transition to strategic surveillance can be executed the foot print of the multinational security forces is expected to shrink significantly.

The Danish military forces in Southern Iraq have three primary missions that all aim at contributing to a more stable development and a better foundation for the reconstruction of Iraq. The missions are: (1) establishment and maintenance of security, (2) military support to the civilian reconstruction mission, and (3) training of the ISF.[57] The size of the Danish military forces in Iraq has changed with the changes in the security situation in the area of operations

and recently the military support to the civilian reconstruction mission, and the training of the ISF have been given higher priority at the expense of the establishment and maintenance of security following the increased capabilities of the ISF.

Prospects for Future Danish Training and Force Contributions

The security situation in Iraq is still critical and the delay in the establishment of the government has given room to a renewal of sectarian violence. A prerequisite for the reconstruction and the democratic development of Iraq is a certain level of security. By providing security and by developing the Iraqi capacities to this end the international military presence has contributed to the creation of a foundation for democracy and reconstruction. But the accomplished achievements are fragile.

The Iraqis have a vital interest in stopping the violence and they have the best possible starting point to fight the terror and the criminal activities. The Iraqi government too has an outspoken ambition concerning the ability to maintain security without the presence of the multinational security forces. Much has been achieved and it is paramount that the accomplished democratic and economic results are not dropped. To leave Iraq prematurely could have enormous consequences.

It is important not to leave the entire burden related to the improvement of the security situation, democratic consolidation, and continued reconstruction with the still fragile civilian and military Iraqi institutions. Therefore both the Iraqi government and the UN have encouraged the multinational security forces to stay and finish the job. Thus in June 2005 the UN extended the mandate for the presence of the multinational security forces until the end of 2007.

Viewed in the light of these parameters it would be wrong to determine a date for withdrawal of the Danish military forces if the withdrawal is not synchronized with the prevailing security situation and the establishment of the ISF. Adjustments to the Danish force contribution should therefore primarily happen parallel to the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi authorities. The Iraqi government assumes an increasingly larger part of the responsibility for the security structures, and through December 2006 more than 320,000 out of an expected total number of 355,000 security force members have been recruited and to varying degrees trained, so there is encouraging progress being made.[58] The multinational security forces still have the overall responsibility for the security but it is the expectation that the Iraqis gradually will be able to assume this responsibility. The process is on-going throughout Iraq and it should be this process that determines when the time is ripe for a withdrawal of the multinational security forces.

In Southern Iraq the Al Muthanna and the Maysan Provinces are expected to become the first provinces where the responsibility can be transferred to the Iraqis, followed by the Dhi Qar and the Basra Provinces. In the Al Muthanna and the Maysan Provinces the multinational security forces currently conduct primarily support and reserve missions for the ISF that has become increasingly capable of maintaining the security situation. When the conditions are right and following the decision of the Security Transition Committee, the full responsibility can be transferred completely to the Iraqi authorities. Then the multinational security forces will expectedly be regrouped and reduced in order to conduct initially operational surveillance and eventually strategic surveillance.

Synchronized with the transfer of responsibility for the security to the ISF it is likely that the configuration of the Danish military forces and the missions assigned to them will undergo changes that will mirror the fact that the time for the transfer of the full responsibility to the Iraqi authorities is drawing closer. When the full responsibility for the security is transferred to the Iraqis in the Basra Province, the focus for a Danish force contribution could be adjusted toward a contribution to a reserve force in Southern Iraq responsible for support to the ISF with priority to the continued training of these forces. Also the establishment of a well working community founded on the rule of law with the outmost respect for human rights should be given the highest priority.

Finally, the Danish contribution to the training of the Iraqi police forces will expectedly remain a top priority within the overall Danish support for the reconstruction of Iraq. This project is an important part of the overall attempt to support the Iraqi authorities' endeavors to take over full responsibility for the security. Again respect for human rights must remain a primary priority.

<u>Conclusion</u>

There are three main tendencies in Iraq today, and they are parallel and mutually influential: (1) the progress in the political process, (2) the endeavors to rebuild the country, and (3) a continued critical security situation with violent incidents especially in the central part of the country but also in other areas with mixed religious-ethnic population groups. A necessary part of the solution dealing with the violence must be found in the political process where the genuine involvement of the Sunnis can reduce the level of violence. The wish of Shia and Kurdish leaders to control the political process and the initial Sunni refusal to participate in this process have also played a significant part in the renewal of the sectarian violence and the religious prosecution that increased following the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.

Additional terrorist attacks committed by foreign terrorist organizations cannot be stopped by political means, however, but must be dealt with by the ISF supported by multinational security forces.

The overall strategy of the international community is a coherent effort with the element of security as one among several equally important elements. The establishment of a peaceful, stable and democratic Iraq requires a multi-faceted strategy including: (1) the political arena, (2) the economic sphere, and (3) the security aspect. It is the intention to establish Iraqi capabilities to enable governance in the best interests of the people.

The Danish strategy is representative of a sincere desire to contribute to the establishment of a free and democratic Iraq, and it is furthermore Denmark's philosophy that the international support for Iraq and the Danish three-lane strategy must continue until the desired end state has been achieved.

Today Iraq has a democratically founded constitution, three elections were completed successfully in 2005, and the parliament has convened and elected a new president, a new prime minister, and a new chairman of the parliament. A broad coalition government can contribute significantly to reduce the sectarian violence provided that all Iraq's dominant political, ethnical, and religious groupings are given genuine influence. Parallel with this development Iraq is back on the track with the aim to become a respected member of the international community. When the political transition process as described in SR 1546 has been completed the foundation stones for a continued development of the Iraqi democracy will be positioned and the remaining unsolved problems can be approached and solved.

The Danish strategy assumes that the remaining significant challenges only can be solved with continued international support including Danish assistance to the consolidation of the Iraqi democracy and the necessary reforms; in other words a continuation of the current strategy. The Danish three-lane approach is tightly synchronized with both the current international efforts and the wishes of the Iraqi Government for a future democratic, stable, and secure Iraq. Furthermore the strategy is aimed directly at solving the key challenges of the Iraqi population and the Iraqi nation as they are seen both by the Iraqis themselves and the outside world. It is a well balanced approach and strategy confronting the three main issues simultaneously understanding that failure to accomplish a secure environment will impact significantly on the ability to achieve an effect on the progress in the political process and the endeavors to rebuild the country.

The Danish national strategy is also based upon the interagency concept involving three governmental departments: (1) the Department of Defense, (2) the Department of State, and (3)

the Department of Justice. This enables the two last mentioned departments to operate under the security umbrella provided by the Department of Defense resources, primarily in the form of the Danish Battle Group in the Basra Province. The synergetic effect is significant and allows for employment of assets and resources that otherwise would not be introduced until complete cessation of hostilities.

The Danish interagency strategy meets the Iraqi request for international assistance, it focuses on the three main assistance areas as identified by the Iraqis themselves and the international community, and it is tightly nested and synchronized with the overall coalition efforts. As long as that is the case the Danish strategy should proceed unchanged along this established track.

Endnotes

[1] National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, November 2005, pp. 10 – 11.

[2] National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, November 2005, pp. 1 – 2.

[3] The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index tracing Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Iraq, December 14, 2006, pp. 9 – 15 and Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004) December 5, 2006, Chapter II, Paragraph E, Sub-paragraph 38 – 40.

[4] Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004) December 5, 2006, Chapter II, Paragraph D, Sub-paragraph 35.

[5] The International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE) assessed that the elections generally had met international standards. Approximately 75% of the Iraqi population participated in the elections compared to 65% participation in the elections for the new Iraqi constitution, and 58% participation in the parliamentary elections, both in 2005. See: International Mission for Iraqi Elections, Final Report on the December 15, 2005, Iraqi Council of representatives Elections, Appendix 2: Voter Turnout by Governorate.

[6] The US Department of State, The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs' Iraq Weekly Status Report, December 13, 2006, p. 25.

[7] Out of 275 seats totally the United Iraqi Alliance won 128 seats (loss of 12 seats) and thus this group lost its previous absolute majority position. The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan came in as the second largest group with 53 seats (loss of 22 seats). This result was seen as a consequence of the political competition with the rivaling group the Kurdish Islamic Union who won 5 seats (gain of 5 seats). The Sunni – Arab list, the Iraqi Accord Front, won 44 seats (gain of 44 seats) and another Sunni group, the Iraqi National Dialogue Council, won 11 seats (gain of 11 seats). Overall the results represented a noteworthy gain of Sunni seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's group, the Iraqi National List, won 25 seats (loss of 15 seats). See: International Mission for Iraqi Elections, Final Report

on the December 15, 2005, Iraqi Council of representatives Elections, Appendix 4: Iraqi Council of Representatives Elections, Votes and Seats Summary.

[8] Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004) December 5, 2006, Chapter V, Paragraph A.

[9] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting on June 8, 2004.

[10] To ensure swift, flexible, and coordinated donor financing for priority investments in Iraq, the World Bank and the United Nations have created the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). The Facility helps donors channel their resources to the Iraq reconstruction effort. The Facility encompasses two trust funds: (1) United nations Development Program and (2) The World Bank. See: www.IRFFI.org, accessed December 18, 2006.

[11] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting on June 8, 2004.

[12] National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, November 2005, pp. 25 - 26.

[13] National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, November 2005, p. 10.

[14] United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, October 2003, Executive Summary, Paragraph i.

[15] United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, October 2003, Executive Summary, Paragraph xv. - xx.

[16] The World Bank Country Brief, Middle East & North Africa Region (MENA) – Iraq, August 2006, p. 1.

[17] The World Bank Country Brief, Middle East & North Africa Region (MENA) – Iraq, August 2006, p. 1 and the United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, October 2003, Chapter 2, Paragraph B. Macroeconomic Framework.

[18] United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, October 2003, Executive Summary, p. ix, Sub-paragraph xxv.

[19] United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, October 2003, Executive Summary, Sub-paragraph xxvii.

[20] United States Government Accountability Office, testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 8, 2006.

[21] The World Bank Country Brief, Middle East & North Africa Region (MENA) – Iraq, August 2006, p. 1.

[22] The Iraqi Public Distribution System (PDS) is the largest existing public food program in the world. The program ensures that basic food items such as flour, rice, sugar and food oil

reach even the poorest parts of the Iraqi population. The UN food program, World Food program, assesses that approximately 25% of the Iraqi population are heavily dependent on PDS followed by 35% that are assessed to be partially dependant on the program. Totally it is estimated that 97% of the Iraqi households receive food aid. See: Iraq Public Distribution System, World Bank Discussion Note, USAID Workshop March 1, 2006.

[23] At the Madrid international donor conference in October 2003 the international community promised to support Iraq with approximately 33 billion dollars. See: Council Foreign Relations background information concerning Iraq, http://www.cfr.org.publication/7682/# 3, accessed December 14, 2006.

[24] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[25] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[26] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[27] The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) is a national human rights institution in accordance with the UN Paris Principles. It became part of the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights January 1st 2003. See: http://www.humanrights.dk, accessed December 14th 2006.

[28] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[29] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[30] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[31] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[32] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[33] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[34] The Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004) December 5, 2006, Chapter V.

[35] Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser for the DCI on Iraq's WMD, September 30, 2004, Regime Strategic Intent, Annex B.

[36] A car bomb exploded during prayers outside the holiest shrine for Shiites, Imam Ali Mosque (Tomb of Ali). More than 125 people were killed including the influential cleric Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, the Shiite leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). See: http://www.ustoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-08-29-iraq-mosque.

[37] National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, November 2005, p. 4.

[38] Badr Brigade or Badr Corps was the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Headed by Hadi Al-Amiri it participated in the 2005 Iraqi election as part of the United Iraqi Alliance Coalition. Because of their opposition to Saddam Hussein, the Badr brigade was seen as a U.S. asset in the fight against Baathist partisans. After the fall of Baghdad, Badr forces reportedly joined the newly constituted army, police, and interior Ministry in significant numbers. It has played a leading role in fighting insurgents in Karbala. While the organization has lessened the burden on coalition troops there have also been tensions between the two. There have been reports of gun battles between the organization and British troops that occupied the area. See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/badr, accessed December 19th 2006.

[39] National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, November 2005, p. 11.

[40] Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 91 Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias within Iraq, June 2, 2004, Section 4 Transformation and Reintegration of Residual Elements of Armed Forces and Militias.

[41] The Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004) December 5, 2006, Chapter III, Paragraph E.

[42] National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, November 2005, pp. 8 and 18 – 19.

[43] Currently the ISF grows by 5,000 members monthly and presently the ISF encompass approximately 240,000 members including 110,000 members of the armed forces and 130,000 police officers. The goal is to increase these numbers to 137,000 and 188,000 respectively by

2007. See: The US Department of State, The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs' Iraq Weekly Status Report, December 13, 2006, p. 9.

[44] Multi-National Security transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) is the branch of the Multi-National Force – Iraq that is responsible for developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), i.e. the Iraqi military forces and the Iraqi Police. The stated mission is to train the ISF so that they become capable of defeating the insurgency and taking responsibility for maintaining security within Iraq. Inexplicitly this should be done so that the Coalition can reduce the number of troops in Iraq. See: http://www.mnf.iraq.com, accessed December 18, 2006.

[45] "Iraqi Security Forces Chart Country's Course to Self Sufficiency", September 11, 2006, http://www.usinfo.state.gov, accessed December 18, 2006.

[46] MNF-I, "The New Iraq, Security Forces, The New Iraqi Security Forces", http://www.mnf.iraq.com, accessed December 18, 2006.

[47] The President of the United States and the Iraqi Prime Ministers November 30, 2006 meeting concerning the transfer of security to Iraqis, http://usinfo.state.gov, accessed December 14, 2006.

[48] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[49] The Danish contingent consists of a number of elements of which the Danish battalion in the Basra province is the largest. The Danish battalion is subordinated to a British brigade that forms part of the British led division in Southern Iraq. The battalion consists of a mechanized infantry company, a reconnaissance company, a headquarters and service support company, an engineer detachment, a military police detachment, a medical platoon, a unit performing military support to the reconstruction mission, and a national support element. A Lithuanian contingent is included in the Danish battalion. Additionally the Danish contingent includes personnel attached to the British brigade and division headquarters in the Basra Province, personnel attached to a mutual British – Danish training support team, personnel to the Polish led division, and personnel attached to NATO's training mission and CMATT, both in Baghdad. See: Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Harens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[50] The Danish contingent of police officers includes personnel to CPATT in Baghdad and the commander of the Danish – British police training in the Basra Province. See: Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Harens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[51] NTM-I homepage, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/NTM-I.htm, updated 11-FEB-2005, accessed December 14, 2006.

[52] NTM-I homepage, releases, Fact sheets, "NTM-I Year in review 2005", http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/NTM-I.htm, accessed December 19, 2006.

[53] NTM-I homepage, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/NTM-I.htm, up-dated 11-FEB-2005, accessed December 14, 2006.

[54] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[55] MNF-I homepage, "The New Iraq, Provincial Iraqi Control, August 8, 2006", http://www.mnf.iraq.com, accessed December 19, 2006.

[56] Forsvarskommandoens indstilling vedrørende operativt betingede tilpasninger i et fortsat dansk bidrag til den multinationale sikringsstyrke i irak fra februar 2007 (in Danish).

[57] Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om Fortsat Dansk Bidrag til en Multinational Sikringsstyrke i Irak, fremsat den 12. januar 2006 (in Danish), Forsvarskommandoens Direktiv for Dansk Styrkeindsættelse i Iraq (in Danish), and Hærens Operative Kommandos Iværksættelsesbefaling for Danish Contingent/Iraq (in Danish).

[58] The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index tracing Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Iraq, December 14, 2006, p. 25.